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In this paper we use the ALSPAC cohort of 12,000 births to examine the effect of maternity rights on 
mothers’ post-birth return to employment decisions. We aim to disentangle the effects of the terms of 
maternity rights entitlements from the effects of other factors (such as household wealth, personal 
preferences and labour market opportunities) that influence the timing of a mother’s return to work. We 
adopt a discrete hazard model with instrumental variables to estimate a counterfactual of what mothers 
with rights would have done in the absence of this legislation. Mothers with rights have an underlying 
(but unobserved) stronger attachment to the labour market which prompts earlier return than on 
average. Nevertheless, even when we take this into account we find a substantial impact of maternity 
rights on behaviour. Having rights induces around 20 per cent more women to return to their previous 
job before 7 months than would otherwise be the case. Women from lower skilled groups return 
disproportionately at the date at which maternity pay expires, while managerial and professional 
women tend to return at the expiry of unpaid leave. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Maternity rights legislation has been operating in the UK with only minor changes 
since 1979. Under these rules a mother who has worked with the same employer for 
two years and who has stopped working later than 11 weeks before the expected 
due date can take up to 29 weeks leave after the birth and be guaranteed a return to 
their previous job. For 18 weeks the mother is financially compensated after which 
any further leave taken is unpaid. In this paper we use a cohort of 12,000 
(pregnancies and) births that occurred in the UK county of Avon UK in 1991 and 
1992 to examine the effect of maternity rights on mothers’ post-birth return to 
employment decisions. We aim to disentangle the effects of the terms of maternity 
rights entitlements from the effects of other factors (such as household wealth, 
personal preferences and labour market opportunities) that influence the timing of a 
mother’s return to work.  
 
This analysis has two key motivations. Firstly, the UK government is in the process of 
enacting legislation that will extend the lengths of both paid and unpaid leave. 
Understanding the way in which mothers respond to a given regime of maternity 
rights should enable us to throw some light on the likely consequences of this policy 
change. Secondly, in a separate paper we explore the effects of maternal 
employment on children’s cognitive and behavioural outcomes. To the extent that 
maternity rights policy influences the timing of return to work it potentially has 
implications for child, as well as maternal, welfare. 
 
Our data clearly show that mothers with maternity rights disproportionately return to 
work when paid and unpaid leave cease (at 4 and 7 months). So whilst 40% of all 
women are back at work by 8 months, this is nearly four times as high (56% to 12%) 
among those still in employment in the last trimester of the pregnancy (a requirement  
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to have rights) than those not. Furthermore, the characteristics of mothers who return 
at each of these two dates differ, in that less skilled women and those with non-
working partners mainly return when paid leave stops, whereas professional and 
managerial women with working partners return at 7 months when unpaid leave 
ends. We adopt a discrete choice hazard model with instrumental variables (IV) to 
estimate a counterfactual of what mothers with rights would have done in the 
absence of this legislation. This suggests that mothers with rights have 
characteristics (such as higher education) that would mean that they would tend to 
return to work early even without legislation. Furthermore IV estimation suggests that 
this group had an underlying (but unobserved) stronger attachment to the labour 
market which would also prompt earlier return than on average. Over and above 
these observed and unobserved population differences, having rights induces around 
20% more women to return to their previous job before 7 months than would 
otherwise be the case. So in 1991/2 40% of women were back at work before their 
child was 8 months old and maternity rights legislation is partly responsible for this 
pattern of early return.  
 
Section 2 presents the structure of legal rights in the UK and the current proposals 
for reform. Section 3 discusses the, mainly, US literature on the behaviour of women 
after birth. Section 4 lays out a simple theoretical model of how rights will affect 
behaviour. Section 5 lays our estimation strategy and how we can control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Section 6 describes the data used and presents some 
basic information. Section 7 reports results estimates discrete choice hazard models 
with instrumental variables to identify the specific effect of rights on behaviour. 
Section 8 offers some conclusions.  
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2.  The policy context 
 
The ALSPAC dataset surveyed mothers whose expected delivery date fell between 
1
st April 1991 and 31
st December 1992, so it is the policy regime in effect at this time 
with which we are concerned. The following highlights only the main points of 
maternity legislation (a more detailed treatment can be found in Appendix B). 
 
The right to return: Mothers were entitled to return to their pre-birth job at any time up 
to 29 weeks after the birth provided that they had worked for the same 
employer for a minimum of 2 years full-time or 5 years part-time. They were 
also required to work at least until the 11
th week before their EWC (expected 
week of confinement). 
 
Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP): SMP was payable for a maximum of 18 weeks. 
Those women who fulfilled the conditions for the right to return (see above) 
received 6 weeks SMP at 90% of their previous salary, followed by 12 weeks 
paid at a flat rate. Women who did not meet these conditions but had been 
continuously employed by the same employer for 6 months received the basic 
flat rate payment for all 18 weeks. 
 
Maternity Allowance (MA): MA was paid by the DSS, also for a maximum of 18 
weeks, at a lower flat rate than SMP.  MA covered some women who were 
unable to qualify for SMP, such as the self-employed and those who had 
changed employers. 
 
Contractual Maternity Pay (CMP): CMP covers any arrangements beyond the 
statutory minimum made at the employer’s discretion. Some employers relax  
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the rules on who is eligible for rights, on the length of coverage or on the 
amount of benefits paid. 
 
Currently the lengths of paid and unpaid leave are unchanged at 18 and 29 weeks 
respectively. However, the qualifying restrictions for both rights have been relaxed so 
that some women who were not eligible in the early nineties would be today. The 
government’s proposals for reform, which are in the process of being enacted, are 
that the length of paid leave be extended to 26 weeks and that of unpaid leave to 52 
weeks. 
 
3.  Existing Literature 
 
This section briefly reviews the findings of some studies that have examined the 
relationships between the return to work decision, leave entitlements and other 
characteristics of the mother (in particular her pre-birth work status). The 
methodology of certain key papers is discussed more fully later. 
 
Waldfogel and Berger (2001) provide a good summary of the literature on post-birth 
employment decisions, most of which is US-focused. There is some consensus that 
women who worked during pregnancy are more likely to work after birth and return 
more quickly than women who did not work during pregnancy (e.g. Smith, Downs 
and O’Connell, 2001). The higher the opportunity costs of withdrawal from the labour 
force, the less likely it is that a mother will stay at home. For example, higher 
education and higher wages are associated with an increased probability of return 
while other family income is negatively related to the probability of early return (Desai 
and Waite, 1991).  
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With regard to the effects of maternity leave, there is evidence that leave policies do 
affect the return decisions of new mothers. Waldfogel (1999) finds that the passing of 
the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act in the US (which guaranteed 12 weeks of 
job-protected maternity leave for qualifying women) led to increased leave-taking 
among the newly-covered. Ross (1998) is in accord with this finding and estimates 
that leave lengths for those who gained coverage rose significantly after the 
introduction of the act. Several papers (e.g. Waldfogel, 1998, Glass and Riley, 1998) 
find that mothers who worked in pregnancy are more likely to return to their pre-birth 
employer (rather than quit the labour force or take a new job) the greater the 
generosity of that employer’s leave policy.  
 
Whilst of general interest, most of this work does not directly address the effect of 
maternity rights on the duration until a mother returns to work. Waldfogel and Berger 
(2001) tackle this issue. In a similar spirit to this paper they estimate a hazard model 
of time until return in the US and find that women with leave coverage return sooner 
than those without coverage. They also find that mothers with leave coverage are 
more likely to take a leave of more than six weeks but less likely to take a leave of 
more than twelve weeks. The first result suggests that maternity rights are successful 
in allowing mothers to stay out longer than the maximum allowed for the period of 
disability following childbirth in the US. The second result suggests that the 12-week 
limit of the FMLA-mandated leave period causes women to bring forward their return 
in order to retain their pre-birth jobs.  
 
Ondrich, Speiss, Yang and Wagner (1998) use data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel to directly address the question of how extensions to the length of 
maternity leave affect behaviour. They postulate that the extension of the job 
protection period potentially has two distinct effects. The ‘horizon’ effect serves to 
delay a mother’s return by allowing her stay out longer and retain her old job. The  
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‘replacement’ effect relates to the fact that although the mother has the right to return 
to her old employer until the end of the protection period, the longer she stays out the 
more likely it is that she will be ‘replaced’ in her pre-birth job. As her human capital 
depreciates during her time at home, she may find that after a long leave she returns 
to a position that is inferior to her pre-birth working environment. Ondrich et al argue 
that after an extension this effect could lead to a fall in the end-of-leave cumulative 
return probability, essentially because of a decline in the opportunity cost of staying 
at home.  
 
In order to test their predictions they estimate return to work hazards and utilise the 
fact that German federal law has increased the potential duration of maternity leave 
five times since 1985. They find that an increase in potential duration of leave from a 
time limit of  1 T  to  2 T  leads to a decline in hazard rates prior to  1 T  and an increase in 
hazard rates between  1 T  and  2 T . They interpret this as evidence that an increase in 
leave entitlements causes mothers to delay their return but that most will not take full 
advantage of the new leave period because of fears of ‘replacement’. The exception 
to this seems to be women with high education and labour force experience. They 
are more likely to take their full leave entitlement and return to work at  2 T  as soon as 
it expires. 
 
The present paper uses the ALSPAC dataset to analyse the effects of maternity 
rights legislation in the UK. The key problem that arises in any attempt to measure 
the impact of a policy intervention concerns how one constructs the counterfactual – 
what the outcome for an individual would have been if they had not been exposed to 
the intervention. Unlike Waldfogel and Berger (2001), for example, we are unable to 
exploit exogenous regime changes over time. We therefore apply several alternative  
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techniques to minimise selection bias and so to capture the true effects of rights 
entitlements on behaviour. 
 
4.  Theoretical framework 
 
Here we present a basic framework for thinking about how mothers’ behaviour may 
change in response to the existence of maternity rights. The model has deliberately 
been kept as simple as possible in order to highlight the key effects of maternity 
rights and so abstracts from complications such as uncertainty and discounting. 
 
Let T  be the time elapsed since the birth of the child (in months),  P T  is then defined 
as the date at which maternity payments expire,  R T  (>  P T ) is the date at which the 
right to return to one’s old job expires and  F T  is the end of the analysis period. The 
definition of the analysis period as finite serves to simplify the model considerably. 
The mother’s decision problem is to choose  * T , the date at which she returns to 
work or, equivalently, the amount of time she is available full-time at home with the 
baby.
1 
       
We also assume for convenience that when a mother returns to work she remains in 
the same job until  F T  and that she receives the same wage throughout her 
employment. The wage at which a mother starts back depends on whether she 
returns to her old job or begins a new one. We assume that the wage in her old job, 
O w , is strictly greater than the wage in a new job,  N w . 
 
                                                 
1 Since all the discussion relates to a single individual we suppress individual sub-scripts here 
but note the wage fall on return to a new job and preferences will vary across individuals.  
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We can think of this wage difference as reflecting the return to firm-specific human 
capital and is analogous to that found in the cost of job loss literature (see Farber, 
1993, or Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993). Gregg and Wadsworth (2000) 
show that men and women starting new jobs after a spell out of work receive wages 
well below others with the same characteristics. There is also more specific evidence 
that new mothers do in fact take a wage cut when they seek new employment after a 
birth (see for example, Waldfogel, 1998).  
 
As the right to return expires at  R T  we can write the starting wage w as a function of 
* T . If a mother returns by  R T  her wage throughout employment is  O w ; if she returns 
after  R T  her wage is  N w . 
*) (T w   O w =  if  R T T £ £ * 0     (1) 
  N w =  if  R T T > *  
 
Maternity pay is paid at rate m per period which for simplicity we assume is a 
constant fraction, a , of the pre-birth wage. Maternity pay is received in every period 
from birth until it expires, or the mother returns to work, whichever happens first. 
m  O w a =  for  ) *, min( 0 P T T T £ £   1 < a   (2) 
  0 =  otherwise 
   
Mothers are also able to rely on other family income which is received at a constant 
rate  y  per period. 
 
Because the changes in wages and maternity pay are essentially binary, it is simplest 
to analyse this model in a static framework that converts rates of income flow into 
total income received between 0 and  F T . To this end we define W  as the total  
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earnings from employment which, ignoring discounting, is simply the starting wage 
defined in (1) multiplied by the number of periods for which it is 
received: *) ( *) ( *) ( T T T w T W F - ￿ = . We can calculate total income from maternity 
pay,  M , and total income from other sources, Y , in a similar 
way: ) *, min( *) ( P T T m T M ￿ =  and  F T y Y ￿ = . Finally, we can define total income from 
all sources between 0 and  F T , I , as the sum of these three elements. 
Y T M T W T I + + = *) ( *) ( *) (     (3) 
 
Mothers also derive utility from income and from time spent with the baby. The 
mothers’ utility function will also incorporate heterogeneity of tastes for income and 
time preferences. The decision problem is to choose  * T  to maximise the utility she 
receives from the two sources.  
*] *), ( [ max
* T T I U U
T =     (4) 
We assume positive marginal utility of income and positive but diminishing marginal 

























     (6) 
 
Given this utility function we can derive indifference curves with a slope given by the 
marginal rate of substitution.  
 
Our question of interest is how the optimal value of  * T  varies with changes in  P T  
and  R T . We can illustrate graphically how our assumptions about the wage and 




indifference curves in our model have the standard form and it is the opportunity set 
















Figure 1 shows how the opportunity set for an individual changes with the 
introduction of maternity rights. With no maternity pay and no right of return an 
individual would face the opportunity set ABC, the slope of which is simply -wN. 
Introducing the right to return, which expires at TR, and maternity pay, which expires 
at  P T , yields an opportunity set of DEFGH. The kink point at E is caused by the fact 
that the withdrawal of maternity pay if a mother returns at any time before  P T  
imposes an effective tax rate of a  on earnings in this period. For all return dates 
after  P T , the introduction of maternity pay has a pure income effect equal to the 
distance HC. The steeply sloped section EF reflects the fact that if a mother returns 











TP  TR  TF  T*2  T*1 
Individual 1 
Individual 2  
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home another month is higher. However, if she returns after  R T  her total earnings fall 
to  *) ( T T w F N - , hence the discontinuity at FG. 
 
How might the imposition of maternity rights affect behaviour? Figure 1 illustrates just 
2 of the many possible cases. In the absence of rights, Individual 1 would choose to 
return at  1 * T . When the opportunity set shifts to DEFGH, she increases the amount 
of time spent at home with the baby to  R T . Thus this individual delays her return for 
as long as possible without losing the right to return to her old job. The effect of 
introducing maternity rights for Individual 2 is to decrease the amount of time spent at 
home with the baby. This mother has relatively strong tastes for time at home 
compared to income and would return at  2 * T  in the absence of rights. With rights 
however, her return time falls to  R T . It is optimal for her to sacrifice some of the time 
spent at home in exchange for the higher income from returning to her pre-birth job. 
 
It is worth noting that although both individuals would return at the same time,  R T , 
were they eligible for rights, the indifference curve of neither is tangent to the 
opportunity set at the optimal  * T . The discontinuities in the opportunity set lead to 
the well known result that individuals with non-identical preferences may choose 
exactly the same allocation. We would thus expect to observe clustering at the kink 
points E and F which is in fact exactly what we do observe in the data (see Section 
6). 
 
This framework helps to give some predictions as to the effects of various 
characteristics on return times. We would expect that lower income from other 
sources [Y] would lead mothers to value income relatively highly compared to time 
with the baby, and thus be on a flatter potion of the indifference curve and to tend to  
  13
return earlier. The larger the wage gap  N O w w - , the greater the discontinuity at FG. 
If this cost of separation reflects loss of firm specific human capital then those with 
longer tenures will return earlier. If in addition there is a loss of returns to human 
capital (as found by Gregg and Wadsworth, 2000, for all people returning to work 
after a separation) then this will especially affect the better educated.  Again, this 
may make mothers more likely to get caught at the corner point F as there is a 
stronger incentive to retain one’s old job. In general, the higher the wage, the greater 
the opportunity cost of time spent at home. On the other side, factors which raise the 
utility of time spent with the baby will tend to increase return times, for example if the 
baby were unwell.  
 
5.  Estimation Strategy 
 
5.1 The selection problem 
 
Our estimation strategy is to produce estimates of when mothers with maternity rights 
would have returned if they had not had maternity rights or pay. This should enable 
us to see which mothers’ behaviour was shifted and by how much their preferred 
return time changed. In terms of Figure 1, we know mothers’ optimal  * T s for the 
opportunity set DFGHI and we wish to predict what the optimal  * T s would have 
been if mothers had faced the opportunity set ABC. We can then examine which 
characteristics, such as education and social class, are associated with shifts of 
different magnitudes and direction.  
 
The standard starting point is to predict a return time for mothers with rights on the 
basis of the behaviour of those without rights. There is a selection problem here, 
however, that will result in biased estimates of the counterfactual return time.  
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Mothers with maternity rights are those women who satisfied the qualifying conditions 
in terms of their previous employment experience. They will thus have been 
employed by the same employer for a considerable period of time and will have 
remained in their jobs well into their pregnancies. The variable indicating maternity 
rights status will be correlated with unobservables such as tastes for work that will be 
negatively correlated with return times. The maternity rights variable is thus 
endogenous and if we predict the behaviour of mothers with rights on the basis of 
those without rights we will tend to overestimate the length of time they would have 
spent at home. 
 
Several methods have been used to deal with this problem in the literature on 
maternal employment. Desai and Waite (1991) estimate hazard models of the 
mother’s return to work decision although they make no attempt to estimate the 
effects of maternity entitlements. They recognise that unobserved heterogeneity 
amongst the women in their sample exists along a dimension they call ‘work 
commitment’. Their solution is to control for long-run preferences by including a 
variable of the response to the question ‘What would you like to be doing when you 
are 35 years old?’. They classify women who want to be working at 35 as having 
‘high work commitment’ and those who would prefer to be at home or engaged in 
some other activity as having ‘low work commitment’.  
 
In a similar spirit, we include as a control an attitudinal variable that helps to ‘net out’ 
the unobserved factors that are correlated with rights status. The variable we use is 
the response to the question ‘What is the youngest age at which you think it is alright 
for a mother to leave her child regularly in the care of another person during the 
day?’. This was asked at 32 weeks gestation. We argue that the response to this 
question reflects attitudes towards work and child-rearing that at least partly capture 
the degree of the mother’s work orientation. Mothers with maternity rights are more  
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likely to believe that children can be left in another’s care at a younger age (see 
Section 6), as we would expect. Thus including this variable as a control mitigates 
the downward bias in the counterfactual hazard caused by the omission of labour 
market commitment. 
 
However, only if our attitudinal variable fully captures the heterogeneity in 
unobserved work commitment will our results be unbiased. As it is unlikely that one 
variable can fully reflect all the unobserved differences between women with rights 
and those without rights, we explore two further methods of correcting for 
endogeneity bias. 
 
First we explore the technique of sample selection also used by Waldfogel and 
Berger (2001). They take as a sample only those women who worked in the last 
trimester of pregnancy and, in some specifications, only those who also returned to 
work in the first year following the birth. The assumption is that the unobservable 
factors will be common to all women with this degree of labour market commitment. 
We follow this method of limiting our sample by discarding all the observations for 
women who did not work at all during their pregnancies. We argue that these women 
can be classified as having ‘weak’ labour market commitment and so do not provide 
a good comparison group for mothers with rights whose labour market commitment is 
‘strong’. To test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption we compare them 
with the results from the alternative method of just controlling for endogeneity bias. 
 
Second, a standard strategy for overcoming the endogeneity problem is the 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. This method serves to ‘cleanse’ the maternity 
rights variable of the components that are correlated with both it and return time. 
Hujer, Maurer and Wellner (1997) use this technique within a hazard model to 
examine the effect of vocational training on the duration of unemployment spells in  
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West Germany. Their problem is analogous to ours in that it is likely that there are 
unobserved factors correlated with both training participation and unemployment 
duration. Following Hujer et al we propose the probability to be entitled to maternity 
rights, which we estimate using a probit model, as a suitable variable. We discuss the 




The essence of our strategy is to estimate hazard models of time until return to work 
after a birth for mothers with maternity entitlements and for those without 
entitlements. Taking the observed characteristics of mothers with rights, we can 
apply the estimated coefficients from the first model estimated on the full sample to 
obtain a predicted hazard of when they actually returned. We can then apply the 
coefficients from the second model to the same sample to obtain predicted hazards 
of how this group of women would have behaved if they had not had rights. The 
difference between the two predictions gives us the effect of maternity rights on 
behaviour at each month of duration in the sample period.  
 
This section first outlines our basic econometric model. We then go on to detail the 
extensions to the basic model that are needed to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity bias. 
 
The estimation model we use is a discrete time version of the Cox Proportional 
Hazard model (see Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993, for example). The Cox 
model assumes that the hazard of return to work after the birth is of the form 
) )' ( exp( ) ( ) ( 0 b l l t X t t i i ￿ =     (7)  
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where  ) ( 0 t l  is the baseline hazard at time t,  ) (t X i  is a vector of (potentially time-
varying) explanatory variables for individual i and  b  is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated. The associated continuous time survivor function is 




b t t l t t l i
t t
i i X d X t S ￿ - = - = ￿ ￿   (8) 
 
If durations are only observed as whole months completed (as in our data) then an 
observed duration of t  whole months indicates a duration in continuous time of 
between t  and  1 + t  months. The probability of exit in the tth month for person i is 
)) 1 ( ; 1 ( )) ( ; ( ) 1 Pr( + + - = + < £ t X t S t X t S t T t i i   (9) 
and the survivor function at the start of the tth month is 
)) ( ; ( ) Pr( t X t S t T i = ‡     (10) 
The hazard of exit in month t is thus given by 
))] ( ; ( / )) 1 ( ; 1 ( [ 1
)) ( ; (
)) 1 ( ; 1 ( )) ( ; (
) | 1 Pr( ) ( t X t S t X t S
t X t S
t X t S t X t S
t T t T t t h i i
i
i i
i + + - =
+ + -
= ‡ + < £ =
      (11) 
If we assume that the covariates  i X  are constant within each interval then we can 
write the hazard function as 
))] ( )' ( exp( exp[ 1 ) ( t t X t h i i g b + - - =     (12) 
where  t t l g d t
t
t




= . This specification allows us to estimate  ) (t g  as a fully 
non-parametric baseline hazard with a separate parameter for each duration interval 
(in our case each month).  
 
In this paper we estimate a generalised form of the discrete time hazard where the 
coefficients on several of the explanatory variables are allowed to vary over the 
duration of time spent at home. In the case of the rights variable, for example, this  
  18
enables us to capture the idea that maternity rights should have a strong effect on 
the hazard prior to their expiry dates but less effect at longer durations. 
 
We can write the discrete time hazard in this case as 
))] ( )' ( )' ( exp( exp[ 1 ) ( t t Z t X t h i i i g b + - - =     (13) 
The variables are divided into two groups: those whose coefficients remain constant 
(the  X  vector) and those which take a different coefficient in each month (the Z  
vector). In the basic model the  Z  vector contains only a constant [a dummy for with 
rights] and the  X  vector contains all the variables. In the extended model the Z 
vector also contains maternity rights status and potentially other covariates as well. 
  
In fact, we would like to allow for the possibility that the effect of all the explanatory 
variables on return time, not just the time profile of the baseline hazard, varies with 
rights status. Thus we interact all the covariates with rights status or, equivalently, we 
estimate separate models for each sub-sample according to their rights entitlement. If 
2 , 1 = k  indexes women with rights and women without rights respectively then we 
estimate two hazards of the form: 
))] ( )' ( )' ( exp( exp[ 1 ) ( t t Z t X t h k ki k ki ki g b + - - =   (14) 
 
Our Z vector contains mother’s social class and partner’s employment status 8 
weeks after the birth in addition to the constant. (We do not interact class and 
partner’s employment with every month, however, but allow their coefficients to vary 
over 3 separate periods within the 34 months observation period.) Social class based 
on occupational classifications is a broad proxy for the wage (the opportunity cost of 
remaining at home) and partner’s employment is a proxy for other household income. 
Their inclusion allows for the fact that the effect of maternity rights on behaviour at 
different points in time (particularly at the expiry dates) may vary with the mother’s  
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characteristics. For example, mothers with little other household income are more 
likely to be affected by the expiry of paid leave than the better off. 
 
We estimate the discrete time hazard using a complementary log-log model in which 
we regard each exit or continuation in each month as an observation. First we define 
i c  as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the mother returns to work within the 
observation period (34 months after the birth in our case) and equal to zero if her 
duration is censored. The ith individual contributes  i d  observations to the sample 
where  i d  is her observed duration (completed or censored) in months. We then 
define a set if indicator variables  1 = it y  if individual i has a completed duration of t 
whole months and  0 =  otherwise. Thus 
1 = it y  if  t di =  and  1 = i c     (15) 
      0 =  otherwise 
So if a mother does not return by the end of the observation period (i.e.  0 = i c ), 
0 = it y  for all t. 
 
The log-likelihood for mothers in the kth category of rights status can then be written 
in sequential binary response form as: 
))} ( 1 ln( ) 1 ( ) ( ln { ln
1 1







- - + ￿ =￿￿
= =
  (16) 
 
5.2.1 The instrumental variables technique 
 
Earlier in this section we outlined three alternative methods for tackling the problem 
of the endogeneity of the maternity rights variable. We first present results in which 
the only attempt to control for endogeneity is the inclusion of our attitudinal variable.  
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The second approach is to restrict the without rights category to those who worked 
during the pregnancy which is pre-condition for having rights. This makes the 
comparison group more like those with entitlements in that they have a recent period 
of employment and are thus likely to have stronger labour market attachment. But as 
the reasons people worked and not had rights might not be exogenous (because 
they have chosen to work part-time in the past, for instance) we also present results 
in which rights status is instrumented. 
 
Using the IV technique, we substitute actual entitlement to maternity rights with the 
probability of entitlement, a variable we argue will be correlated with actual 
entitlement but not with return time. We estimate these probabilities using the 
following probit model: 
i i i W q e a + = ' *     (17) 
1 = i q  if  0 *> i q  
0 = i q  otherwise 
* i q  is the propensity to be entitled to maternity rights and is not observed.  i q  is 
actual entitlement. The vector  i W  contains all the explanatory variables from the 
hazard model ( i X  and  i Z ) plus a set of instruments that provide some exogenous 
variation in whether women who worked in pregnancy qualified for maternity rights or 
not. The estimated probability for individual i to be entitled to maternity rights is 
) ˆ ' ( a i W F  and it is this variable we use to replace actual rights status in the hazard 
model.  
 
5.2.2 Analysing the effect of maternity rights on behaviour 
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Having estimated the various models in the ways outlined above, how can we use 
our results to say something about the effects of maternity rights? Although we have 
used a hazard model to derive our results, it turns out that it is most convenient for 
interpretation if we present the estimated distribution rather than the hazard. The 
question of interest is how mothers adapt their return time (either forwards or 
backwards) in response to rights entitlement. We are therefore less interested in the 
probability of return in a particular month given no return up to that point than in the 








= . The probability distribution can thus be derived from the 
hazard: 
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Our method is to compare the distributions derived from the following estimated 
hazards: 
))] ( ˆ )' ( ˆ )' ( exp( exp[ 1 ) ( ˆ
1 1 1 1 1 t t Z t X t h i i i g b + - - =   (19a) 
and 
))] ( ˆ ) ( ˆ )' ( exp( exp[ 1 ) ( ˆ
2 1 2 1 1 t t Z t X t c h i i i g b + - - =   (19b) 
) ( ˆ
1 t h i is the predicted hazard for when a women with maternity rights ( 1 = k ) actually 
returned as it uses the estimated coefficients for the sample ‘with rights’ ( 1 ˆ b  and 
) ( ˆ1 t g ) .  ) ( ˆ
1 t c h i  is the counterfactual predicted hazard for when a woman with rights 
would have returned if she had not had rights – it uses the estimated coefficients for 
the sample who worked in pregnancy but did not have rights ( 2 ˆ b  and  ) ( ˆ2 t g ).  
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Of course, in the IV model the rights variable is continuous rather than binary so we 
can no longer estimate a separate hazard model for each rights category. Instead we 
estimate one model in which the probability is interacted with all the other covariates. 
We can then construct the actual and counterfactual return probability distributions by 
assigning different values to the probability (one low and one high) and calculating 
the overall predicted probability of return at each month of duration. 
 
6.  The data 
 
The data we use come from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parent and Children 
(ALSPAC) which surveyed 14000 pregnancies in the Avon area in 1991 and 1992. 
Contacting mothers was undertaken through medical agencies, so that this is not a 
national sample of births but effectively a localised census. The sample contains 
details of 12,007 births with at least some post-birth data. This lower number reflects 
late miscarriages, still births and refusal to participate post-birth. This latter attrition is 
not random and is disproportionately among lone and less educated mothers. Our 
working sample size is somewhat smaller than this as a result of selecting only those 
who report information on return dates (1882 missing observations) and whether they 
worked during the last trimester of pregnancy (which defines maternity rights). The 
main sample is thus 9582 observations. 
 
Our observation period for the duration of time spent at home is censored at 34 
months after the birth. Between the start of the study and this date mothers answered 
8 questionnaires on their own circumstances, 4 of which were administered prior to 
the birth. They also answered a further 6 questionnaires after the birth related directly 
to their children. Data on the actual month of return is available only up until the 34 
month questionnaire. Beyond that, we know if a mother returned between 34 and 47 
months but not the exact date of return. Although the ALSPAC dataset is extremely  
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rich, its main focus is on the health and development of children and it does have 
limitations from an economic point of view. The following section sets out how we 
have generated our key variables from the information available. 
 
6.1 Return times 
 
The dependent variable in all our analysis is the age of the study child in months 
when the mother started work after the birth. The 29-week cut-off for the right to 
return, then, falls in the 7
th month after the birth. With regard to maternity pay, the 
situation is complicated by the fact that mothers are able to begin their paid leave 
period a number of weeks prior to the birth. Thus the 18
th week after the birth (or the 
4
th month in our framework) represents the maximum date for the receipt of statutory 
maternity pay. If, as anecdotal evidence suggests, most mothers start their paid 
leave just prior to the delivery date, then the 18
th week will actually fall in the 3
rd 
month. So we would expect the expiry of maternity pay to range over several months, 
particularly when employers’ arrangements beyond the statutory minimum are taken 
into account.  
 
We have no information on whether a mother returned to her pre-birth job or began a 
new job. We also make no attempt to take account of her subsequent employment 
behaviour after the return nor whether she worked full or part time on return. We do 
observe, however, whether she was working during the pregnancy. 
 
6.2 Maternity rights and labour market commitment 
 
Although we do have data on pre-birth employment, we do not know whether a 
mother actually qualified for maternity rights. As a proxy, we define a mother as 
having maternity rights if she worked in the 28
th week of her pregnancy or later.  
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Those who stop working prior to this date even for medical reasons will lose the right 
to return to the same employer post-birth. So those classified as not having rights 
can be split into two sub-groups – those who worked in pregnancy but stopped 
before 28 weeks (in what follows we title these as having “some attachment” to the 
labour market) and those who did not (weak attachment). The latter group is 
discarded from the sample when we focus our analysis on the women with the 
strongest labour market attachment (see Section 5). Other missing variables are 
wages, both pre- and post-birth, and other family income. 
 
6.3 Overview of the data 
 
The question we are asking is whether employment rights induce mothers to return to 
work earlier than would be the case in their absence. Our model suggests that the 
utility from income is traded off against utility from caring for the child in these early 
months. Maternity rights encourage early return by protecting the wages in the pre-
birth job which are higher than those that can be obtained in a new post but only on 
condition of return by 7 months. Table 1 shows these issues from the mothers 
perspective; mothers hold a wide range of views about when they feel it is alright for 
a child to be left in the care of other adults. Some 28% of the sample think this can 
be as early as 6 months, whilst 29% think that this is not true until the child is aged 
over 36 months. Those mothers with employment rights disproportionately make up 
the population of mothers who feel it is alright to leave the child when very young but, 
even so, women with employment rights are frequently returning to work before they 
feel comfortable about doing so. So, in Table 1, 22% of women with rights who feel a 
child should be at least a year old before being left in the care of others are back at 
work by the end of the 4th month and another 15% are back by the 7
th month. Those 
without employment rights with the same beliefs return much less frequently in these  
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early time windows. So it appears that a lot of women are concerned about a trade 
off between protecting their employment position and their child’s welfare.  
 
Before going on to examine the explanatory variables in detail, we can take a quick 
overview of the data to get an idea of the patterns in return times. Table 2 describes 
the population of study and when mothers returned across the sub-groups discussed 
above. Some 63% of mothers fall into our “with rights” category where they worked 
late into their pregnancy, whilst 9% worked during the pregnancy but stopped 
working prior to 28 weeks (some attachment). The first striking thing about return 
patterns is how many women are back at work very early after the birth. Some 23% 
of all mothers are back at work by the end of the 4
th month, or when paid leave ends. 
By the end of the 7
th month some 40% of mothers have returned. For those with 
maternity rights however, nearly one third are back by 4 and nearly 55% by 7 
months. By contrast around a third of all mothers have not returned by the end of the 
34
th month; just 19% of those with rights and over 60% of those who did not work 
during the pregnancy. Figure 2a shows the unconditional monthly distributions of 
return times for mothers with rights and for mothers without rights. The large spikes 
at 3 and 6 months in the distribution of those with rights are immediately noticeable. 
Given the timing and the fact that we do not observe comparable spikes for those 
without rights, it is plausible that this clustering is the result of maternity legislation, as 
predicted by our theoretical model. Figure 2b makes this clear by reporting the 
differences in return rates across those with and without rights. It is also noticeable 
that there are smaller spikes in the data at 12, 18, 24 and 30 months. We argue that 
although this may be partly due to rounding errors in the reporting of return times, it is 
also likely to reflect rounding in behaviour in that mothers may make long-term plans 
to return ‘after a year’, ‘after a year and a half’, etc. 
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Figure 3a groups the data in Figure 2b into 6 time windows so that it is easier to see 
the timing of events. In this raw data the return among those with rights is markedly 
higher right through to 7 months. Some 6 percent more mothers with rights are back 
at work before the child is 3 months old and another 17 percent at the 3-4 months 
spike. Another 19% more mothers with rights are back by the 7
th month. Those 
without rights are slightly more likely to return between 12 and 34 months but the big 
gap is in not having returned at all by the 35
th month. So these populations have a 
very large behavioural difference with a swing of just under 40% of the population 
shifting between returning by 7 months (with rights) or staying out to beyond 34 
months (without rights).  
 
The lower panels of Table 2 and Figures 3b and 3c highlight how these differences in 
patterns of return vary across dimensions of the population which are likely to 
influence outside income sources and the value of the mother’s wage on return. 
Mothers with rights in lower class occupations are relatively more likely to return 
during the paid maternity leave period (up to 4 months) and less likely to return 
during the unpaid leave period compared to higher paying occupations. Likewise 
those with non-working partners and maternity rights are the most likely to return by 
the end of the 7
th month and especially by the end of the paid leave period. So those 
with the greatest reliance on the mother’s income return earliest whereas 
professional/managerial women with working partners make most use of the 
maximum unpaid leave period. 
 
6.4 Other independent variables 
 
Of course, the inferences made above assume that the distribution of return times of 
those without rights accurately reflects how the women with rights would have 
behaved in the absence of their entitlements. No attempt is made to control for  
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differences in the composition of the two samples – either on observable factors or 
unobservable factors. This, then, is the role of the duration analysis. We can include 
a wide range of other controls (the full list of the independent variables and their 
means is given in Appendix Tables A1 and A2) but our theoretical model suggests 
that we should narrow our focus to certain key variables. The mother’s education, 
social class and age all provide proxies for the opportunity costs of remaining at 
home with the baby. Variables capturing the partner’s employment, education and 
social class provide information on the other financial resources available to the 
household. And variables relating to the health of the mother and baby, and to 
attitudes, should help to control for constraints and to some extent unobservable 
‘tastes’ for staying at home with the baby. As the set of the explanatory variables is 
very large and many are likely to be highly correlated, we discuss the impact of 
introducing controls in groups. In addition to basic controls, such as the mother’s age 
at birth, the ethnicity and the sex of the baby, we have four groups of variables; the 
mothers social and financial capital, household composition, health information on 
the mother and the child, and our set of instruments which are discussed later.  
 
6.4.1 The mother’s social and financial capital 
 
This covers her highest educational qualification, her social class (which is derived 
from information about her last known occupation). Whether she worked full time, 
part time or casually in her last employment gives further information on the likely 
opportunity costs of remaining at home. The household’s home ownership status is 
also included as an indicator of household wealth. Three variables relating to the 
mother’s childhood and family background serve to capture other less tangible 
aspects of her social capital. Finally, we include a measure of ‘disruption’ to the 
mother’s life in the 8 months after the birth. This weighted life event score is 
calculated by asking the mother whether 40 ‘life events’ (such as an illness, the loss  
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of a job, divorce, etc) occurred in the relevant period and if so, how strongly they 
affected the mother. The total score is the sum of the number of events that 
occurred, weighted by their reported effect on the mother. This measure helps to 
control for shocks that may affect the mother’s ability or desire to return to work. 
 
6.4.2 Household composition 
 
We include a set of variables to control for the composition of the household during 
pregnancy, e.g. numbers of siblings and the gap since the previous birth and for 
subsequent pregnancies after the birth of the study child. For the purposes of the 
duration analysis we introduce a time-varying covariate – a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 in every month from the conception of the first child after the birth 
of the study child to the end of the observation period. This ensures that subsequent 
pregnancies do not affect the hazard of return before they occur. For mothers where 
the date of conception is missing we simply include a dummy variable that equals 1 
in all months if she had at least one pregnancy. A separate dummy captures any 
further pregnancies during the observation period. Information about the partner (if 
one exists) also falls into this category. We include partner’s residence status and 
their employment status 8 weeks after the birth and also education and social class 
to proxy the partner’s wage. Partner’s health prior to the birth is also included as this 
may help reflect the importance of the mother’s earnings to the household. 
 
6.4.3 Health and pregnancy related variables 
 
This section covers various factors that might affect the mother’s preferences for time 
spent with the baby. We include measures of the mother’s physical and mental 
health at 8 months after the birth and a variable capturing whether or not the 
pregnancy was intentional. From the time of the birth we looked at measures of the  
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strongest analgesia used in labour, whether the baby had a low birth weight and 
whether the baby was admitted to a special care unit but none of these proved 
important in the return to work timing. The attitudinal variable discussed in the 
introduction and more substantially in Section 5 on the youngest age the mother 
thinks her child may be left in another’s care also falls into this section. 
 
 
7.  Results 
 
7.1 Conditioning on characteristics and stated preferences  
 
First we report results from separate discrete hazard models for those with and 
without rights. The very large number of individual coefficients means that we report 
the most important results via figures showing time variation in patterns of return (full 
estimation results are given in Appendix Table A3). The figures show the predictions 
of what mothers with rights would have done on the basis of the two equations. Here 
we discuss the general pattern of results across the major groupings discussed 
earlier. Among women without employment rights, older women are less likely to 
return to work quickly, as are less educated mothers without rights. Those with no 
partner or a non-working one are also less likely to return quickly. Those that worked 
part-time in their last job do return earlier than those that worked full-time. This 
probably proxies that the person worked more recently, as part-timers needed longer 
periods of work to gain rights in 1991/2. The numbers of adults and older siblings in 
the household made no difference to return timings for those without rights. The 
reported health of the mother and child post-birth are not important either. Further 
births over the time window observed reduced the likelihood of return to work. Having 
a partner who was in a professional or managerial job extended the period before a 
mother returned to work. The final point of note is that those women who report that  
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they believe that it is not alright not leave the child in the care of another adult before 
that child reaches a year are substantially less likely to return to work early. This 
captures to some degree the mother’s attitudes to parenting. Over and above the 
main focus of our results to be discussed shortly there are some other differences in 
patterns of return among those with maternity rights. Older women are not less likely 
to return to work quickly and part-time workers in last job are not more likely to return 
early. Women who have rights and have had a previous birth are more likely to come 
back quickly than those without rights (probably reflecting a previous choice). The 
distribution of the attitudinal variable is of interest as it is consistent with our 
hypothesis that it proxies unobserved attitudes towards work and child-rearing.  
 
The main story is, however, contained in the Figures 4 and 5. Here we report the 
differences between the predicted return times for mothers with rights from the  
models estimated on those with and without rights. So we are looking at what women 
with rights did compared to what a woman with equivalent observable characteristics 
did without rights. The differences here then are corrected for having different 
characteristics and only reflect different propensities to return for given observed 
characteristics. Figure 4a thus repeats 2a but the lower line is now reflects what 
those with rights would have done in their absence. The main point of this is how 
similar the picture in Figures 4a and 4b are when compared to Figure 2a and 2b. 
Controlling for observable heterogeneity thus leaves the difference rights make to the 
pattern of return times broadly unchanged. Figure 5a-c confirms this unchanged 
picture applies to the differences in the heights of the two spikes across occupation 
groups and whether there is a working partner or not.   
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7.2 Selection of those working during pregnancy 
 
Having worked immediately prior and into the pregnancy is a pre-requisite of having 
maternity rights. This required labour market attachment is likely to contain 
information about the mothers not captured by other observable characteristics. But 
there are many who have worked but are not entitled to these rights. These working 
without rights contain a mixture of part-timers who have to work far longer to achieve 
maternity rights and those who for a variety of reason do not continue to work 
through to 11 weeks prior to the expected due date.  Some of this latter group are 
likely to have stopped work for medical or other reasons.  These can be thought of 
being weakly exogenous to the individual’s underlying labour market attachment and 
form the basis of our instrument set. This group who have recent employment 
histories but no rights form a more natural comparator group than mothers who have 
no recent work history. So we next explore how this group’s return patterns compare 
with the main with-rights group. As for all mothers without rights, older women who 
have recently worked but do not have rights are less likely to return to work quickly, 
and younger (under 20) mothers return more quickly than prime age mothers or the 
same age groups with rights. Those mothers without rights who have no partner or 
one who is not resident in the same household are less likely to return to work than 
the same groups with rights. But the main differences in return patterns are described 
in Figures 6a,b and 7a-c. The ‘worked during pregnancy but without rights’ group 
return to work earlier that those with no recent past employment history. Hence in 
Figure 6a the comparator line to the with rights group is now higher than for the full 
sample. There are still no spikes at 3 and 6 months but there is a clearer sense that 
there are more mothers without rights returning to work from 8 to 34 months than 
among those with rights. In other words there is a stronger picture that having rights 
is drawing women, who would have returned by the time their child reached age 3   
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but after 7 months, to return at the 3 and 6 month spike points. The sense that these 
two spikes are made up of different groups remains, with the first spike consisting 
more of lower waged occupations and those with non-working partners and the 
second of professional and managerial women with working partners. 
 
7.3 Instrumental Variables 
 
Despite the fact that observable differences between mothers with and without rights 
explain little of the differences in return times it is likely that having rights reflects a 
greater attachment to the workforce as well as the legal entitlements. Hence we use 
an instrumental variables approach to capture this unobserved component (see 
equation 17). Our instruments are designed to capture reasons why someone may 
not stay in employment through to the third trimester (which prevents rights 
entitlement) for reasons that are exogenous to the mothers’ attachment to the labour 
force. These fall into three broad groupings: 
 
7.3.1 Residence and life events in pregnancy 
 
These variables include whether the mother had lived in the Avon area for less than 
a year, whether she moved house during her pregnancy and if so, whether her 
partner simultaneously started a new job. The rationale is that changes in location 
due to her partner’s employment provide a weakly exogenous reason for mothers to 
leave their employment before they qualify for maternity rights. In a related vein we 
use a weighted life events score (see above) for the period of pregnancy. The 
accumulation of disruptive events in the mother’s life provides another potential 
source of exogenous variation in whether she qualifies for maternity rights. Note that 
we have a similar measure post-birth included to capture whether the mother 
generally has a more chaotic life. So the idea is that by chance a number of events  
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have happened to the mother making completion of the pregnancy whilst at work 
more difficult. 
 
7.3.2 Work related variables 
 
It is likely that the characteristics of a mother’s pre-birth job influence her decision of 
whether to remain in her job long enough to qualify for maternity rights. We include 
variables related to whether her workplace was noisy or smoky, whether she was 
exposed to chemicals or fumes in her job and her usual mode of travel to and from 
work. 
 
7.3.3 Pregnancy and Health during pregnancy 
 
This section relates to events that may happen in pregnancy that cause the mother to 
fear for the welfare of the unborn baby, for example if she had a miscarriage scare. 
Such events might lead mothers to be particularly protective of their physical health 
and so perhaps to leave work before qualifying for maternity rights. In a similar spirit 
we include variables that deal with problems in previous pregnancies that may make 
the mother particularly cautious. Examples are whether she had previously had a 
miscarriage or a premature baby. In our data, there are a large number of pregnancy-
related physical and mental health measures during pregnancy. We pay particularly 
attention to pregnancy-related ailments such as morning sickness, hypertension and 
diabetes as these illnesses should have no impact on behaviour after the birth. 
Longer-term health considerations will influence behaviour both before and after the 
birth and so will not fulfil the conditions necessary for a valid instrument. 
 
Table 3 is a table of the means and standard deviations of the instruments. All our 
explanatory variables are categorical. Hence the means given in Table 3 are the  
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proportion of the sample (who answered that question) that fall into each category. 
Data on one or more characteristics are missing for some respondents. To avoid 
excluding these women, dummy variables denoting the presence of missing values 
for each characteristic are included in the estimation model. 
 
It is clear from Table 3 that those who worked during pregnancy with and without 
rights differ substantially across our instruments. Those who stop working during the 
pregnancy are more likely to have moved to the area, moved house coincident with 
partner starting a new job and have had far more life event shocks occurring during 
the pregnancy period. They more often worked in noisy, smoke and fume filled 
environments and are far less likely to travel to work by car. They also report more 
past miscarriages or low weight births and far more health problems during the 
pregnancy, including being hospitalised. The table also reports F-tests for the 
instruments which suggests they are strong predictors of having rights. 
 
Figures 8a-b and 9a-c report the same information as before but now use a 
comparison of predictions on the basis of having a low predicted probability of having 
rights (equivalent to the mean in the ‘no rights’ group) and a high one (equivalent to 
the predicted propensity in the ‘with rights’ group). This instrumentation suggests that 
about a third of the early return among mothers with rights as compared to those who 
worked but were without rights stems from residual unobserved stronger labour 
market attachment. Now some 20% more mothers with rights are predicted as 
returning before 8 months than in the benchmark prediction. The results also suggest 
that that this early return comes mainly from women who would otherwise not return 
before 35 months rather than bringing forward return from 8 to 34 months (far right 
hand part of 9a). So this model which combines selection and instrumentation 
suggests that about half of the raw differences in early return by mothers with 
maternity rights actually stems from differential labour market attachment rather than  
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the legal entitlements. However, there remains a substantial impact of these rights on 
behaviour. These rules drive the formation of two spikes in the pattern of return 
times. The first, at 3 to 4 months, stems from the termination of paid leave and draws 
more lower skilled women and those with non-working partners than the second 
spike at 6 to 7 months. This second spike contains mainly professional and 
managerial women with working partners. Mothers returning early as a result of 
having rights would often have not returned by 34 months in the absence of legal 
entitlements, especially the less skilled. So having rights makes a big difference to 
return timing.   
 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
The 60% of mothers with maternity rights return to work rapidly after giving birth, 
giving large spikes in the return time pattern at the ending of paid leave and unpaid 
leave at 4 and 7 months respectively. Less skilled mothers and those with no or a 
non-working partner return disproportionately at the ending of the earlier paid leave 
spike, while professional/managerial mothers with working partners tend to return at 
the later spike at the ending of unpaid leave. By contrast, a clear majority of the 40% 
of mothers without maternity rights do not return before their child is aged 3. So on 
the face of it maternity rights results in profound changes in behaviour.  
 
However, those with rights will differ markedly from those without them. In particular 
labour market attachment will differ, as having rights requires an extended period of 
employment prior to the birth. We adopt a three stage strategy for controlling for 
observed and unobserved differences across the two populations. In the first stage 
we control for a raft of the obvious observable differences that split these 
populations, covering age of mother, their education and social class and mothers  
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mental and physical health and also characteristics of any partner. We also condition 
on mothers’ attitudes about the age at which they believe that it is safe to leave the 
child in the care of another adult. This is intended to capture otherwise unobserved 
differences in tastes or preferences across mothers. This conditioning makes very 
little difference to the raw results. The large spikes in the return time distributions are 
clearly not driven by observable differences in characteristics. 
 
The second stage is to restrict our comparative sample to those who worked during 
the pregnancy. These women thus also have recent labour market attachment and 
such as might be expected to return to work earlier than other women without 
maternity rights. It is estimated that 31 percent more mothers with rights return to 
work at the two spike points than would occur for similar people without rights but 
who worked in pregnancy. The first two stages of conditioning thus make relatively 
little difference to the estimated size of the spikes at 3 and 7 months as in the raw 
data 36% more mothers with rights return at these spikes than those without them. 
 
The third stage is to use instrumental variables to identify women who lost their 
maternity rights for reasons unconnected to their labour market attachment. Here we 
exploit the fact that women need to work up to 11 weeks before the expected due 
date to maintain their rights. This even applies to stopping early for medical reasons. 
We explore evidence of mothers experiencing health problems during the pregnancy, 
whose workplace is smoky, noise or difficult to commute to and those who move 
because their partner has changed jobs. These events strongly predict women 
stopping before 11 weeks in advance of the due date and hence predict why some 
mothers lost maternity rights. Using this information as our instrument set allows us 
to control for any residual unobserved differences between mothers with rights and 
the rest of the sample. This final stage of conditioning reduces the proportion of 
mothers predicted to return at the two spikes to just 19 percentage points more than  
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would occur without maternity rights. This suggests that women with rights differ from 
other mothers in important but otherwise unobserved dimensions. The model also 
suggests that most of these mothers who are induced to return before 8 months 
would, in the absence of rights, stay out until the child is at least 3 years old.  
 
Having maternity rights affects the return behaviour of managerial and professional 
women more than those in less skilled occupations. But the lower skill groups do 
return disproportionately at the earlier spike coincident with the ending of unpaid 
leave. Mothers in lower skilled occupations do make use of paid leave but then either 
return to work at 4 months or stay out till the child is much older. In a similar vein, 
women with working partners with maternity rights tend to stay out to the end of 
unpaid leave whereas those with no or a non-working partner tend more to return at 
the end of paid leave. The government is currently proposing to extend paid leave to 
6 months and unpaid leave to a year. Based on the evidence seen here we would 
expect to see large spikes form at these return times consistent with these new 
dates. Our model would predict that around 8 percent of mothers with rights would 
move from the current spike at 3 months to the new one at 6 months. This will mainly 
consist of less skilled mothers and those without a working partner. In addition, a 
small number of these groups who currently cannot afford to continue on unpaid 
leave and do not return until the child is aged at least 3 will switch all the way to the 6 
month ending of paid leave. Our model also suggests that almost all mothers who 
currently return at the ending of unpaid leave 7 months will continue to 12 months 
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Differences in estimated distributions of return times 
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0-5 mths 6-11 mths 12-35 mths 36 mths +
% who answered question 27.5 29.9 13.2 29.4
Of which:
With rights 0.84 0.75 0.51 0.40
Without rights 0.16 0.25 0.49 0.60
With rights
Return date
0 to 4 months 0.51 0.20 0.22 0.24
5 to 7 months 0.25 0.38 0.15 0.09
after 7 months** 0.24 0.42 0.63 0.67
Without rights
Return date
0 to 4 months 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.06
5 to 7 months 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04
after 7 months** 0.81 0.83 0.90 0.90
** or not at all
Table 1: Attitudes to child care by rights status and return time
Minimum age child can be left in another's care*
Shaded figures highlight the proportion of mothers, with given beliefs and rights 
status, for whom the window in which their return time fell (e.g. 0 to 4 months) 
was earlier than they reported it was "all right" to leave the child in another's 
care. 
* Response to the question 'What is the youngest age at which you think it is 
alright for a mother to leave her child regularly in the care of another person 
during the day?' 
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0-4 mths 5-7mth 8-34 mths
not by 34 
months
Total 100.0 22.8 17.0 27.5 32.8
With rights 62.8 31.6 24.2 25.5 18.7
Some attachment 9.4 12.0 7.3 37.1 43.6
Weak attachment 27.9 6.6 3.9 28.7 60.9
0-4 mths 5-7mth 8-34 mths
not by 34 
months
Total 100.0 27.7 25.9 24.6 21.8
With rights 76.1 33.4 32.0 21.9 12.6
Some attachment 7.4 16.3 8.8 37.1 37.9
Weak attachment 16.5 6.7 5.2 31.5 56.6
0-4 mths 5-7mth 8-34 mths
not by 34 
months
Total 100.0 22.5 15.0 29.1 33.5
With rights 66.8 29.4 20.4 27.7 22.6
Some attachment 9.1 10.6 5.7 39.0 44.7
Weak attachment 24.1 7.8 3.5 29.2 59.5
0-4 mths 5-7mth 8-34 mths
not by 34 
months
Total 100.0 25.3 10.9 29.0 24.8
With rights 61.0 36.6 13.1 27.8 22.5
Some attachment 13.1 9.7 8.0 35.4 46.9
Weak attachment 25.9 6.7 7.1 28.6 57.6
0-4 mths 5-7mth 8-34 mths
not by 34 
months
Total 100.0 19.6 10.4 24.7 45.3
With rights 45.3 36.0 18.9 26.8 18.2
Some attachment 12.6 7.5 5.8 29.2 57.5
Weak attachment 42.1 5.5 2.5 21.1 70.9
0-4 mths 5-7mth 8-34 mths
not by 34 
months
Total 100.0 15.2 5.9 25.8 53.1
With rights 47.7 25.0 10.7 27.1 37.7
Some attachment 15.2 10.3 2.6 33.3 53.9
Weak attachment 37.1 5.3 1.1 21.1 72.6
0-4 mths 5-7mth 8-34 mths
not by 34 
months
Total 100.0 23.5 18.5 28.2 29.8
With rights 65.8 31.4 25.3 25.6 17.8
Some attachment 8.7 12.8 8.1 39.8 39.3
Weak attachment 25.5 6.9 4.5 31.2 57.5












BY PARTNER'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS AT 8 WEEKS

























Table 2: Cross-tabulations of labour market attachment and return 










coef S.E. mean S.D. R mean S.D. R mean S.D. R
Events in pregnancy
TIMEAVON 0.98 0.99 0.98
no 0.95 0.21 0.97 0.18 0.91 0.29
yes -0.464 *** 0.099 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.29
MOVED 0.96 0.96 0.95
no 0.74 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.65 0.48
yes, no new job for ptr -0.096 * 0.058 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.29 0.46
yes, & ptr had new job -0.175   0.119 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.23
WLESPRE 0.94 0.95 0.91
0-4 0.38 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.25 0.44
5-9 -0.163 *** 0.061 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.45
10-14 -0.338 *** 0.071 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.40
15-19 -0.369 *** 0.090 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.26 0.11 0.31
20+ -0.634 *** 0.089 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.17 0.37
Joint test of events in chi2(10)=96.29
pregnancy variables: Prob>chi2=0.0000
Work-related variables
NOISE 0.80 0.97 0.88
always/often -0.112 * 0.059 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43
smts/rarely 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.61 0.49
never -0.084   0.069 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.35
SMOKE 0.80 0.97 0.88
always/often -0.215 ** 0.084 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33
smts/rarely -0.040   0.051 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
never 0.59 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.57 0.50
FUMES 0.98 0.99 0.98
no 0.88 0.32 0.87 0.34 0.84 0.37
yes -0.101   0.064 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37
TRAVMODE 0.78 0.94 0.87
by foot -0.280 *** 0.076 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.26 0.16 0.37
public transport -0.180 ** 0.078 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32
bicycle -0.777 *** 0.223 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13
car 0.66 0.47 0.70 0.46 0.57 0.49
work at home 0.431 *** 0.150 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15
other -0.122   0.078 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Joint test of work- chi2(14)=113.82
related variables: Prob>chi2=0.0000
Past pregnancies
MISCARRIAGE 0.98 0.98 0.98
no 0.79 0.41 0.82 0.38 0.76 0.43
yes -0.050   0.059 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.43
PREVBWEIGHT 0.54 0.39 0.63
no 0.93 0.26 0.94 0.24 0.92 0.27
yes -0.199   0.144 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
PREMATURE 0.54 0.39 0.63
no 0.91 0.28 0.92 0.27 0.91 0.29
yes 0.024   0.131 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29












All worked in but worked in
pregnancy With rights pregnancy
Table 3: Instruments used in the first stage probit model
1ST STAGE MEANS AND S.D'S OF VARIABLES













HEALTHPRE 0.93 0.94 0.90
always/usually well 0.010   0.053 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.34 0.48
smts/often/always unwell 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.66 0.48
NAUSEA 0.97 0.97 0.94
no 0.145 ** 0.070 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34
yes 0.83 0.38 0.82 0.38 0.87 0.34
VOMITING 0.96 0.97 0.93
no 0.041   0.051 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.49
yes 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.49
HEADACHE 0.98 0.98 0.97
no 0.113 ** 0.048 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.32 0.47
yes 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.68 0.47
VEINS 0.98 0.98 0.97
no 0.85 0.36 0.87 0.34 0.83 0.37
yes -0.034   0.063 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37
DIARRHOEA 0.96 0.97 0.94
no 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.50
yes -0.051   0.047 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.50
BLEEDING 0.95 0.96 0.92
no 0.79 0.40 0.80 0.40 0.74 0.44
yes -0.050   0.057 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.26 0.44
HERPES 0.95 0.96 0.92
no 0.99 0.07 0.99 0.07 0.99 0.10
yes -0.354   0.262 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.10
SUGAR 0.95 0.96 0.93
no 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35 0.83 0.38
yes -0.059   0.064 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38
HOSPITAL 0.95 0.96 0.92
no 0.91 0.29 0.92 0.27 0.88 0.33
yes -0.090   0.079 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33
EPNDPRE 1.00 1.00 1.00
low 0.66 0.47 0.70 0.46 0.59 0.49
medium -0.092   0.058 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42
high 0.030   0.073 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.18 0.38
Joint test of pregnancy- chi2(21)=30.18
related health variables: Prob>chi2=0.0884







Mean probability of entitlement R = response rate to question
   those with rights 0.897
   those without rights 0.693


















Table A1: Variables used in analysis 
 
Variable  Description  # of 
d.v.’s* 
     
  Dependent variable   
     
RETTIME  Age of child in months at return to work (censored at 34 months)   
     
  Explanatory variables   
     
  Basic demographics   
AGE  Age of mother at birth  3 
RACE  Mother’s ethnicity  1 
ADULTS  Number of over 16 year olds in household at 8 weeks gestation  2 
OLDER SIBS  Number of 0 to 15 year olds in household at 8 weeks gestation  3 
INTERVAL  Interpregnancy interval  3 
YSIBS  Number of full-term or incomplete pregnancies in the 34 months after birth of 
study child  
2 
     
  Social and financial capital   
OCCUPATION  Mother’s social class defined according to last occupation  2 
EDUCATION  Mother’s highest educational qualification  2 
SEX   Sex of baby (including category for multiple births)  2 
HOURS  Type of work (i.e. PT/FT) in mother’s current or last job   2 
HOMESTATUS  Housing tenure at 8 weeks gestation  3 
PTRPRESENT  Whether mother has a live-in partner at 8 weeks gestation  2 
PTREMP8W  Partner’s employment situation 8 weeks after the birth  2 
PTREDUC  Partner’s highest educational qualification  2 
PTROCCUPATION  Partner’s social class defined according to last occupation  2 
PHEALTH  Mother’s report of partner’s physical health at 8 weeks gestation  2 
GFHTREDUC  Mother’s father’s highest educational qualification  2 
GMTHREDUC  Mother’s mother’s highest educational qualification  2 
WLESCHILD  Weighted life event score for mother’s life until 17  4 
SCHOOLS  Number of schools attended by mother up to 16  3 
WLES8M  Weighted life event score for the 8 months after the birth  4 
     
  Mother’s health   
HLTH8M  Mother’s report of own health at 8 months  1 
EPND  Edinburgh Post-Natal Depression Score at 8 weeks after the birth
  2 
     
  Attitudes   
INTENT  Whether pregnancy was intentional  1 
MINAGE  Youngest age mother thinks it is alright to leave child regularly in care of 
another during the day 
6 
     
  Instrumental variables   
     
  Events in pregnancy   






Whether mother moved house during pregnancy and if so, whether her 
partner simultaneously started a new job 
 
2 
WLESPRE  Weighted life events score for the period of pregnancy  4 
     
  Work related variables   
NOISE  Whether the mother’s last workplace before the birth was noisy  2 
SMOKE  Whether the mother’s last workplace before the birth was smoky  2  
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FUMES  Whether the mother was exposed to chemicals or fumes in her last workplace 
before the birth 
1 
TRAVMODE  The usual mode of travel used by the mother to and from work in her last 
workplace before the birth 
5 
     
  Previous pregnancies   
MISCARRIAGE  Whether the mother had previously had a miscarriage  1 
PREVBWEIGHT  Whether the mother had previously had a baby weighing less that 5lb 8oz  1 
PREMATURE  Whether the mother had ever had a baby born more than 3 weeks early  1 
     
  Health related pregnancy variables   
HEALTHPRE  Mother’s report of own health during pregnancy  1 
NAUSEA  Whether the mother suffered from nausea during pregnancy  1 
VOMITING  Whether the mother suffered from vomiting during pregnancy  1 
HEADACHE  Whether the mother suffered from headaches during pregnancy  1 
VEINS  Whether the mother suffered from varicose veins during pregnancy  1 
DIARRHOEA  Whether the mother suffered from diarrhoea during pregnancy  1 
BLEEDING  Whether the mother suffered from vaginal bleeding during pregnancy  1 
HERPES  Whether the mother suffered from herpes during pregnancy  1 
SUGAR  Whether the mother suffered from sugar in the urine during pregnancy  1 
HOSPITAL  Whether mother was admitted to hospital during pregnancy  1 
EPNDPRE  Edinburgh Post-Natal Depression Score in pregnancy  2 
     
Notes:  *. Number of dummy variables excluding base case and missing category.   




































Mean S.D. R* Mean S.D. R* Mean S.D. R* Mean S.D. R*
Dependent variable
RETTIME (for those
returned by 34 months) 9.24 7.73 1.00 7.69 6.56 1.00 12.63 8.71 1.00 14.84 9.06 1.00
% returned by 34 months 0.67 0.47 1.00 0.81 0.39 1.00 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.39 0.49 1.00
Basic demographics
AGE 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.96
=<20 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.21
21-25 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39
26-35 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.46
36+ 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
RACE 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
white 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.14
nonwhite 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
ADULTS 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98
less than 2 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.23
2 0.87 0.34 0.88 0.33 0.82 0.38 0.87 0.34
more than 2 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.27
OLDER SIBS 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
0 0.45 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.34 0.48 0.11 0.32
1 0.37 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.44 0.50 0.57 0.49
2 0.14 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42
3 or more 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29
INTERVAL 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.93
first preg 0.47 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.14 0.34
< 1 year 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.33 0.24 0.43
2 to 3 years 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.40 0.31 0.46 0.48 0.50
3 + years 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35
YSIBS 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.96
none 0.64 0.48 0.57 0.50 0.71 0.46 0.76 0.43
1 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42
more than 1 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.10
Social & financial capital
OCCUPATION 0.85 0.95 0.80 0.65
professional & 
managerial/technical 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
skilled non-manual & 
skilled manual 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50
partly skilled & unskilled 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.36 0.13 0.34
(N=9582) (N=6013) (N=900) (N=2669)
Full sample With rights pregnancy in pregnancy
Table A2: Means and standard deviations of variables
Without rights Without rights




EDUCATION 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
cse/none 0.16 0.36 0.11 0.32 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42
vocational/o-level 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50
a-level/higher 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45
HOURS 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.88
ft 0.64 0.48 0.66 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.70 0.46
pt 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.26 0.44
casually 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.19
HOMESTATUS 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
owner-occupied 0.80 0.40 0.87 0.34 0.66 0.47 0.69 0.46
council/ha rented 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.23 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41
private rented 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.33 0.07 0.25
other 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.17
PTRPRESENT 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.93
no ptr 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
lives with ptr 0.94 0.24 0.94 0.23 0.91 0.29 0.93 0.25
doesn't live with 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21
PTREMP8W 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.93
No working ptr 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37
Has working ptr 0.87 0.34 0.90 0.30 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40
No ptr 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19
PTREDUC 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95
cse/none 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.44
vocational/o-level 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.45
a-level/higher 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50
no ptr 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
PTROCCUPATION 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.91
professional & 
managerial/technical 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50
skilled non-manual & 
skilled manual 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49
partly skilled & unskilled 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34
no ptr 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
PHEALTH 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97
always/usually well 0.94 0.23 0.95 0.21 0.92 0.27 0.93 0.25
smts/often/always unwell 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.21
no ptr 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
GFTHREDUC 0.69 0.71 0.66 0.66
cse/none 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.50
vocational/o-level 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.29 0.46
a-level/higher 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41
GMTHREDUC 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.71
cse/none 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.52 0.50
vocational/o-level 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46
a-level/higher 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.39
SCHOOLS 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94
2 or less 0.43 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49
3 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.49
4 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32


















WLES8M 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.95
0-4 0.29 0.46 0.25 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.38 0.49
5-9 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.45
10-14 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37
15-19 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.27
20+ 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.30
Mother's health
HLTH8M 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.95
always/mostly well 0.95 0.22 0.95 0.21 0.94 0.24 0.94 0.24
often unwell/hardly ever 
well 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
EPND 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.96
low 0.74 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46
medium 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39
high 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.32
Child-related variables
SEX 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
male 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50
female 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.50
multiple birth 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11
Attitudes
INTENT 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.99
intentional 0.73 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.68 0.47 0.71 0.46
unintentional 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.46
MINAGE 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97
0-5 mths 0.22 0.42 0.30 0.46 0.15 0.35 0.08 0.27
6-11 mths 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.35
1-2 years 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
3-4 years 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.26 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.40
5 or more years 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.34
never 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.28
don't know 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.42
*R=response rate to question 
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coef S. E. coef S. E. coef S. E. coef S. E. coef S. E.
Basic demographics
AGE
=<20 -0.394 *** 0.106 -0.053   0.149 0.224   0.246 0.322   0.281 -0.722 ** 0.362
21-25 -0.009   0.041 0.159 ** 0.073 0.129   0.135 0.148   0.155 -0.095   0.181
26-35
36+ -0.061   0.056 -0.381 *** 0.114 -0.440 ** 0.211 -0.399   0.262 0.290   0.298
RACE
white
nonwhite 0.144   0.103 0.162   0.186 -0.331   0.351 0.694 * 0.391 -0.573   0.462
ADULTS
less than 2 0.143 * 0.083 0.172   0.146 0.357   0.264 0.025   0.283 0.185   0.335
2
more than 2 -0.002   0.064 0.017   0.107 0.153   0.183 -0.164   0.217 0.264   0.261
OLDER SIBS
0
1 0.072   0.069 0.175   0.137 0.345 * 0.207 1.114 *** 0.301 -1.301 *** 0.350
2 0.163 ** 0.080 -0.010   0.149 0.339   0.234 0.691 ** 0.329 -0.767 ** 0.388
3 or more 0.134   0.122 -0.027   0.170 -0.095   0.312 0.922 *** 0.352 -1.202 *** 0.439
INTERVAL
first preg
< 1 year 0.167 ** 0.080 -0.091   0.140 0.054   0.237 -0.465   0.295 0.576   0.351
2 to 3 years 0.164 ** 0.074 -0.206   0.136 -0.001   0.216 -0.603 ** 0.287 0.732 ** 0.340
3 + years 0.268 *** 0.080 -0.154   0.149 0.145   0.232 -0.698 ** 0.306 1.064 *** 0.364
YSIBS
none
1 baby, timing not 
known -0.292 *** 0.045 -0.539 *** 0.103 -0.546 *** 0.173 -0.830 *** 0.237 0.558 ** 0.263
1st baby*relevant 
period -0.838 *** 0.117 -1.197 *** 0.210 -1.546 *** 0.423 -1.268 *** 0.443 0.464   0.513
had 2nd baby -0.223   0.170 -0.375   0.340 -0.563   0.598 -0.831   0.847 0.772   0.981
Social & financial capital
OCCUPATION
professional & 
managerial/technical 0.247 *** 0.059 0.109   0.085 0.175   0.154 -0.212   0.256 0.459   0.298
skilled non-manual & 
skilled manual
partly skilled & 
unskilled 0.068   0.092 -0.017   0.113 -0.128   0.193 -0.234   0.301 0.285   0.376
OCCUPATION*MTHS 0-4
professional & 
managerial/technical -0.262 *** 0.076 -0.049   0.169 0.189   0.266 0.233   0.421 -0.441   0.473
skilled non-manual & 
skilled manual
partly skilled & 
unskilled 0.290 ** 0.121 -0.093   0.244 0.066   0.389 0.105   0.501 0.165   0.599
OCCUPATION*MTHS 5-7
professional & 
managerial/technical 0.253 *** 0.080 0.309   0.212 0.303   0.339 0.617   0.609 -0.403   0.666
skilled non-manual & 
skilled manual
partly skilled & 






























































cse/none -0.084   0.055 -0.171 ** 0.079 -0.019   0.143 -0.267 * 0.160 0.202   0.199
vocational/o-level
a-level/higher 0.097 ** 0.039 -0.080   0.072 -0.088   0.136 -0.352 ** 0.172 0.437 ** 0.197
HOURS
ft
pt -0.085 ** 0.042 0.279 *** 0.059 0.083   0.127 0.911 *** 0.140 -0.700 *** 0.168
casually -0.297 *** 0.105 0.405 *** 0.109 0.064   0.184 1.019 *** 0.232 -0.888 *** 0.332
HOMESTATUS
owner-occupied
council/ha rented -0.288 *** 0.072 -0.165 * 0.085 0.021   0.154 -0.149   0.172 0.064   0.232
private rented -0.234 *** 0.075 -0.166   0.108 -0.092   0.164 0.031   0.209 -0.075   0.266
other -0.103   0.102 -0.081   0.149 -0.245   0.283 0.156   0.310 -0.246   0.384
PTRPRESENT
no ptr 0.026   0.171 -0.306   0.248 -0.789 * 0.475 -0.081   0.496 -0.060   0.621
lives with ptr
doesn't live with -0.168 * 0.087 -0.153   0.148 -0.895 *** 0.295 0.156   0.297 -0.370   0.357
PTREMP8W
No working ptr -0.045   0.099 -0.412 *** 0.104 -0.514 *** 0.196 -0.679 *** 0.213 0.725 ** 0.287
Has working ptr
No ptr -0.562 *** 0.199 -0.397 * 0.214 -0.188   0.404 -0.423   0.417 0.061   0.571
PTREMP8W*MTHS 0-4
No working ptr 0.189   0.129 0.176   0.216 -0.018   0.154 0.172   0.375 0.025   0.466
Has working ptr
No ptr 0.415   0.256 0.338   0.386 -0.084   0.129 0.255   0.680 0.094   0.867
PTREMP8W*MTHS 5-7
No working ptr -0.240   0.150 -0.070   0.275 0.066   0.397 0.524   0.550 -0.718   0.650
Has working ptr
No ptr -0.297   0.331 -0.838   0.736 0.290   0.597 -0.352   1.291 0.055   1.531
PTREDUC
cse/none 0.093 * 0.049 -0.040   0.081 0.178   0.444 -0.197   0.172 0.338 * 0.203





skilled non-manual & 
skilled manual 0.149 *** 0.035 0.170 *** 0.064 0.007   0.122 0.163   0.145 -0.043   0.166
partly skilled & 




unwell -0.128   0.084 -0.382 *** 0.147 -0.331   0.247 0.164   0.261 -0.454   0.320
GFTHREDUC
cse/none
vocational/o-level 0.027   0.047 -0.057   0.085 -0.051   0.150 0.030   0.191 0.001   0.222
a-level/higher -0.008   0.052 -0.123   0.102 -0.038   0.179 -0.237   0.231 0.223   0.264
GMTHREDUC
cse/none
vocational/o-level 0.024   0.044 0.126   0.082 0.239 * 0.141 0.434 ** 0.188 -0.468 ** 0.216
a-level/higher 0.044   0.051 0.143   0.099 0.166   0.170 0.419 ** 0.208 -0.361   0.241
SCHOOLS
2 or less
3 0.039   0.034 0.099 * 0.060 0.335 *** 0.111 -0.116   0.132 0.215   0.153
4 0.047   0.050 0.058   0.088 0.367 ** 0.157 -0.254   0.187 0.405 * 0.220














































































0-4 -0.258 *** 0.041 -0.272 *** 0.069 -0.099   0.132 -0.280 * 0.153 0.033   0.179
5-9
10-14 0.075 * 0.042 0.114   0.080 0.379 ** 0.148 -0.019   0.180 0.117   0.205
15-19 0.086 * 0.050 0.235 ** 0.098 0.457 *** 0.169 0.060   0.218 0.109   0.250





ever well -0.158 ** 0.072 -0.017   0.112 0.024   0.207 0.122   0.245 -0.240   0.294
EPND
low
medium 0.040   0.041 -0.058   0.069 -0.113   0.126 -0.137   0.155 0.217   0.183




female -0.028   0.029 0.012   0.052 0.032   0.095 0.179   0.115 -0.230 * 0.133




unintentional 0.094 *** 0.035 0.059   0.062 0.152   0.117 -0.188   0.131 0.329 ** 0.153
MINAGE
0-5 mths 0.458 *** 0.037 0.067   0.098 -0.120   0.158 -0.777 *** 0.273 1.232 *** 0.297
6-11 mths
1-2 years -0.291 *** 0.059 -0.256 *** 0.092 -0.564 *** 0.167 0.042   0.215 -0.394   0.258
3-4 years -0.454 *** 0.068 -0.336 *** 0.087 -0.350 ** 0.161 -0.055   0.202 -0.441 * 0.250
5 or more years -0.535 *** 0.082 -0.374 *** 0.103 -0.794 *** 0.225 -0.041   0.245 -0.548 * 0.305
never -0.400 *** 0.094 -0.515 *** 0.125 -0.329   0.238 -0.178   0.284 -0.413   0.352
don't know -0.155 *** 0.047 -0.209 ** 0.082 -0.330 ** 0.147 -0.229   0.195 0.059   0.226
CONSTANT -4.882 *** 0.385 -4.282 *** 0.280 -4.156 *** 0.510 -4.939 *** 0.693 0.198   0.895
OBS
LL 81893 94033 20645
NONZERO 
OUTCOMES 4886 1553 508 6436
LR chi2 368.68
Prob > chi2



































0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix B: Maternity rights in the UK 
 
The dataset used in our analysis relates to mothers whose expected date of delivery 
lay between 1
st April 1991 and 31
st December 1992. The maternity rights prevailing at 




Women had the right to return to the same job at any time up to 29 weeks after the 
childbirth provided that they had either 
•  been employed continuously with the same employer for a minimum of two years 
and worked for at least 16 hours weekly 
or 
•  been employed continuously with the same employer for a minimum of five years 
and worked for between 8 and 16 hours weekly 
 
Statutory maternity pay (SMP) 
 
SMP was payable for a maximum of 18 weeks. To qualify a woman must have 
worked into the 15
th week before her expected delivery date and have paid Class 1 
National Insurance contributions. The higher rate of SMP was paid at a rate of 90% 
of the woman’s usual weekly earnings for the first 6 weeks, followed by a flat-rate 
payment for a further 12 weeks. To qualify for the higher rate the woman must fulfil 
either of the two necessary conditions for maternity leave (see above). Women not 
eligible for higher rate SMP received a flat rate payment for the entire 18-week 
period, provided that they had worked continuously for the same employer for 6 
months. At this time, women had to begin the receipt of SMP before the 6
th week 
prior to the expected delivery date if they were to receive the full amount.  
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Maternity Allowance (MA) 
 
Maternity Allowance, which was paid at a flat rate by the DSS for up to 18 weeks, 
covered some women who were not eligible for SMP. The self-employed who had 
paid full rate National Insurance contributions in 26 out of the 52 weeks prior to the 
15
th week before the baby was due were entitled to receive MA. In addition, women 
with at least 6 months employment out of the 12 months prior to the 14
th week before 
the due date were covered, provided that they had paid full rate National Insurance 
contributions. 
 
Contractual Maternity Pay (CMP) 
 
CMP is paid by those employers who choose to make maternity payments in addition 
to the statutory minimum. Each woman’s employer establishes the qualifying 
conditions (which may be more generous than the statutory requirements) and the 
entitlements (which may relate to the rate of pay, the length of paid leave or the 
length of unpaid leave). 
 
The current regime 
 
Currently all employees are entitled to 18 weeks of Ordinary Maternity Leave, 
regardless of their length of service. Women employed by the same employer for one 
year prior to the 11
th week before the EWC are entitled to Additional Maternity Leave, 
which extends up to 29 weeks after the birth. Mothers may begin their maternity 
leave or payments at any time from the 11
th week before the expected delivery date. 
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The conditions for receipt of SMP have been relaxed so that all women continuously 
employed by the same employer for 26 weeks (prior to the 15
th week before the due 
date) are covered, provided their average weekly earnings in the final 8 weeks 
exceed the lower earnings limit for National Insurance contributions. In addition, all 
women who qualify are now entitled to receive 90% of weekly earnings for the first 6 
weeks. Maternity Allowance is still payable for 18 weeks to some of the women not 
covered by SMP and the qualifying conditions for receipt of MA have also been 
loosened. 
 
The government’s proposals for reform 
 
In the 2001 Budget, the government increased the length of the SMP period from 18 
to 26 weeks (the 90% rate still applies for the first 6 weeks only) with effect from April 
2003. With regard to leave, the government has proposed to introduce 26 weeks of 
unpaid leave to run from the end of the 26 weeks paid leave, instead of 29 weeks 
from the date of birth. This fixes the total leave period (paid and unpaid) at one year. 
The government’s proposals also contain some measures to encourage the 
acceptance of flexible working patterns for parents of young children by employers 
and also to extend the benefit rights of fathers on paternity leave. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 